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Nino Kadic's avatar

The part staunch physicalists often ignore is that more of the same won’t lead to some sudden breakthrough, if the basic facts are ignored and the underlying ontology isn’t recognised. You presented this very clearly, great article!

Mark Slight's avatar

The claim in the title is absolutely correct.

William Gadea's avatar

I agree with you that the hard problem is key. If there were a decision tree for coming to a position on consciousness, the hard problem would be at the top. If your answer is "no, I don't think there is a problem," then I think good epistemic habits would lead you to some flavor of physicalism. If your answer is yes, then further exploration into other hypotheses is necessary, and you would probably choose to explore other forks.

I am starting to become more accepting of other people's intuition, because on a topic like this, intuitions are impossible to avoid (including for me.) I will point out your assumptions, right in the way you're framing the problem. You're making an attempt to explain the "subjective" nature of consciousness. I have argued before that this is an adaptive illusion, and there is no self at the center.

This note here is the best way I can figure out to explain why seeing the brain as modular instead of unitary erases the hard problem: https://substack.com/profile/15728617-william-gadea/note/c-200535666?r=9d4a1&utm_source=notes-share-action&utm_medium=web

Matthew Dorman's avatar

Hi Prudence. I really enjoyed this. Stylistically, it’s clear, confident, and very effective at framing the stakes. You do a great job articulating why the hard problem feels like a category error from within a naturalist lens. From your stance, I can see why that line of thought motivates idealism rather than merely being a critique physicalism.

Full disclosure: idealism has earned a warm place in my philosophical heart, even if I ultimately remain one of those silly, hard-nosed physicalists. I know this risks sounding a bit Joe Rogan / late-night-dorm-mushroom-adjacent, but I’ve always loved the intellectual vertigo that comes from a clean inversion of assumptions: the Matrix moment, the Sixth Sense twist, or the Zen realization that the problem was the frame itself.

One thing I found myself genuinely curious about, though, is what a positive idealist model looks like when allowed to stand on its own legs. Much of the piece’s persuasive force comes from diagnosing where physicalist explanations fall short, and I’d love to see your formidable reasoning and rhetorical skill applied without having to play defense so much.

So if you’re taking requests, I’d be very interested in seeing what your interpretation of a Vedic idealist model of consciousness looks like when laid out directly. This piece however was excellently written and frames the pressure points you see quite articulately. Thanks.

Prudence Louise's avatar

Thanks Matthew, I also love that vertigo and those are two of my favourite movies as well. Let’s contemplate the meta fact that the intellectual realm has its own unique qualia reward system....

I have that exact article next in line and I’m forcing myself to just finish and publish, no perfectionism allowed. It’s taken me forever to write it because I had to find a metaphor to explain it that could go the distance.

The physicalist has it easy, they just point anywhere and say, see all that stuff out there? That’s all there is to it. Then they only need to vaguely mention emergence within dynamic systems and everyone is nodding along in agreement.

But if the idealist tries the pointing thing everyone says, whaaat, you’re saying the whole world is in my mind?! And the conversation is derailed before it even starts. But I’m almost there with it and I’d love feedback when it’s done.

Mel Thompson's avatar

Thank you for this very clear and precise summary of the problem. If I may, I should like to put a link to it on my website, since I feel it would be of great value for students. Okay?

Prudence Louise's avatar

Sure Mel, thanks.

Peter B Lloyd's avatar

Thank you for this clear critique of the neuroscientific bias in consciousness research. As to why so many smart people are totally convinced by physicalism - that is a real puzzle. I have suggested in a Substack post that it is due to collective inattential blindness. That is, people don’t in general focus on their consciousness as they are attending to what is going on in the physical world. So the mistaken belief develops that there simply isn’t any consciousness. It’s like people refusing to believe in the gorilla in the classic experiments on inattentional blindness. Take a look: https://open.substack.com/pub/consceng/p/inattentional-blindness-as-a-cause

Prudence Louise's avatar

I don’t think physicalists are a bigger puzzle than why any humans are reluctant to abandon their cultural story or worldview. We’re only surprised they aren't doing it if we accept their claim they’re the rational and sceptical people who change their minds when the evidence demands it. But that’s their story, not a piece of empirical data they’ve used to construct the story. There are so many things wrapped up in people’s metaphysics or worldviews, it extends way beyond intellectual coherence, our personal and social identity is involved.

Think about the major reconstruction the physicalists worldview would require if they drop their belief science can explain consciousness. It’s close to fatal to their whole world view, it’s far easier to adapt the concept of consciousness than rebuild their entire metaphysics.

That said, your idea of inattentional blindness hits on an important point about how they achieve this adaption of the concept of consciousness. The talk about the contents of consciousness, most often the qualia, and identify it as something else, function or cognition of some kind. That transforms a hard problem into an easy one and now their IOU is safe. And since their IOU is safe, so is their metaphysics, for now at least.

But they ignore the fact that all observation depends on and presupposes consciousness. It’s that recognition that deals with the ontological dimension, the contents of consciousness are only epistemology.

Peter B Lloyd's avatar

Hmm. I don’t think any other “cultural story or worldview” is quite as profound as consciousness denial. Take evolution for example. Many people in the past, and even today, are brought up with the a rock-solid conviction that God created the world in 6 days. It was a big wrench for them to let go of that belief and embrace the conclusions of the science of evolution. Even so, the creation of life on earth was a remote action and one can readily imagine God creating the observed world. It was hard work to erode faith in that old world view. But eroding faith in consciousness denial is the next level up. Things are a bit different for consciousness - for denying consciousness does not simply reject one explanatory hypothesis (like evolution): it rejects the continual presence of self-evident empirical data. That, it seems to me. Is a much deeper error than, say, creationism or flat earth earth theory.

Prudence Louise's avatar

I agree, but I think a physicalist would object by saying they’re not denying consciousness. To give an example, there was a post the other day by the philosopher Walter Veit calling panpsychism pseudo-philosophy and the usual denigrating of non-physicalism as an appeal to “magic”.

I saw another comment he made objecting to Philip Goff characterising physicalism as - “proper respect for science requires us to deny the very existence of consciousness.” He said the more charitable phrasing was - “respect for science requires us to radically rethink the very nature of consciousness”.

Now I agree with your assessment that consciousness isn’t an explanatory hypothesis and so their denial is next level. But this is why I pointed out the distinction between the “contents” of consciousness ie qualia and phenomenal properties, as opposed to the recognition that all observation depends on and presupposes consciousness. The non-physicalist isn’t making a point about epistemology, that consciousnesses is a pre-condition for any knowledge, but an ontological claim that to not assume consciousness as fundamental results in paradox. Consciousness is the "condition" of there being anything to conceptualise etc.

The problem is, that distinction isn’t recognised by the physicalist, they don’t think there is anything over and above the contents. Now I happen to think that denial necessarily involves a pre-commitment to physicalism, so it’s question begging. But they’re going to say it’s a pre-commitment to science as explanatory method, which involves a scepticism of metaphysics in general. So in all cases when they defend their position there will be a continual slide between method and metaphysics, a perpetual motte and bailey tactic.

Aaron's avatar

I agree with you that the hard problem isn’t a neuroscience problem as it’s usually framed. However, I disagree with the conclusion that this forces us toward consciousness as metaphysically fundamental or outside the domain of emergence altogether.

On my view (ECM), the hard problem only arises if we assume from the outset a substance-based picture of reality where “the physical” is ontologically complete and experience must be added on from the outside. Once that picture is abandoned, the demand to explain why experience “exists at all” loses its grip.

Consciousness isn’t something the brain produces in the way steam is produced by boiling water, but neither is it a fundamental ingredient of reality. It’s the lived coherence of a system capable of recursively monitoring and reorganizing itself in response to unresolved error. Subjectivity isn’t missing from physical descriptions because it belongs to a different substance. It’s missing because third-person descriptions abstract away precisely what first-person coherence feels like.

So I agree with you that appealing to “future neuroscience” as an IOU doesn’t answer the hard problem. But I’d also say the hard problem doesn’t point beyond science so much as it points beyond a mistaken metaphysical backdrop we’ve quietly inherited. Once that backdrop is corrected, the “gap” dissolves, not by reduction, but by re-understanding what consciousness is. So often metaphysics is unquestioningly smuggled into these debates before the conversation even begins.

Peter Guy Jones's avatar

Nice article. I wonder how much longer the physicalists will be able to go on ignoring logic and reason.

Don Salmon's avatar

Excellent column.

I have a question - Parapsychologist Dean Radin, for quite a few years, was putting forth a physicalist view that he felt could include parapsychological phenomena. He eventually gave up, but I don't see why a committed physicalist could not come up with such a view.

I think the reason is because, unconsciously, nobody is really a physicalist (David Chalmers expressed that view about Daniel Dennett). And psychic phenomena make it subconsciously clear to us that the physicalist view is simply incoherent.

There have been thousands of experiments, conducted with impeccable methodology and with odds of over a trillion to one against chance being the "explanation." There is no scientific reason to reject things like telepathy, precognition, etc. Once the delusion of physicalism (I include bottom up panpsychism as well) is dissolved (I suspect this will occur by about 2050) we'll finally have the foundations for a radical new science.

But in fact, you don't need controlled research, you only need one example of it. I wrote to Susan Blackmore about this example and she agreed, if it had been sufficiently document, it would have constituted proof of psi for her.

Prudence Louise's avatar

Thanks Don. One of the big problems is the word physical has no clear meaning, the best you can come up with is "what physics studies". I think the point that no one is really a physicalist gets to an important issue. If we’re being charitable to physicalism, the primary motivation is to avoid overly speculative metaphysics. Reason as a tool of gaining knowledge isn’t very decisive, so we need experiment and confirmation to keep us grounded.

The problem happens when people use it to claim their metaphysics is the “scientific world view”. But there's no such thing, that’s just code for "my preferred metaphysical interpretation of the scientific data". The only reason physicalists get away with that is by conflating naturalist scientific method with physicalist metaphysics. That slide is subtle and pervasive in our culture and most people don’t notice it, which is why pointing it out is a recurring theme in my writing. It's dogmatism disguised as open mindedness and it should be called out.

I don’t know much about alternative methodological frameworks for science. If I was going to explore that I’d probably look into Whitehead or Bergson. But that’s a lot of work and my time is limited so it’s not really a priority right now. I’m pretty sceptical about science ever giving us information about spiritual topics. I’d rather explore Vedanta because it isn’t encumbered by all this cultural baggage.

Don Salmon's avatar

I agree with all you wrote.

(1) "Physical." It's been over 50 years that I've been asking physicalists what "physical means as an ontological primary. I think something has changed in the past 10 years. Formerly, people would just scoff and refuse to engage. I've noticed more and more that after time (in one naturalist Facebook group, it took four months!), people will pretty much acknowledge all you wrote, and then say, "But we know physicalism will explain everything, eventually" (in other words, they're slipping right back into the same incoherence - as a clinical psychologist, I've always found this issue to be outside the realm of philosophy and more a matter of therapy!)

(2) Science. Sri Aurobindo wrote extensively on a future science of consciousness. The key here is what people are willing to use the word "science" for. I think a profound mistake was made between the initial explorations of Galileo, Bacon, etc and the hardening of the definition in the 19th century, For at least 100-200 years, "science" was used for a wide variety of ways of gaining knowledge, not solely for the quantitative method of physics.

William James recommended a "radical empiricism." I don't see Whitehead or Bergson as having even remotely the clarity that the Vedantic and Tantric philosophies and spiritual practices have. For example, I think the most successful - so far - integration of science and spiritual wisdom is the 35-year work of B. Alan Wallace, a Tibetan Buddhist monk in India for 17 years, then returning to the US for formal study of physics, philosophy of mind and finally world religions which he taught at UC Santa Barbara for some years.

Well over 2 decades ago, he established the Samatha Project as a 9 month program to train contemplative researchers.

Because in my understanding, the consciousness of human beings is not fundamentally separate (united, of course, ultimately in the Brahman or Purushottama), I don't think any science of consciousness in the sense Sri Aurobindo wrote of is going to be successful until humanity as a whole comes out from under the delusion of physicalism.

The current halting efforts to develop panpsychism, idealism and cosmopsychism are a bare beginning. I remain convinced that at the moment, the best guide we have to the future science is in the writings of Mirra Alfassa and Sri Aurobindo. The best overview of science and spirituality I know of is in the writings of Marco Masi. Though the "Consciousness Based Psychology" of Michael Miovic and Soumitra Basu (psychiatrists based , respectively, in the US and in India),- - drawing on the works of Mirra and Sri Aurobindo - is an enormously important contribution as well.

It's a slow process and the deconstruction of the incoherence of physicalism that you write about is an essential contribution to what I suspect will be a decades long process.

if not centuries long.

Prudence Louise's avatar

I agree the cultural mood is turning and that always happens slowly. But I think “coming out of the delusion of physicalism” is really just the process of moksha, you are brahman, matter is maya. So I don’t expect it to be fixed anytime soon!

Don Salmon's avatar

Maybe the word “delusion” is too strong. I meant at the very least an intellectual understanding the physicalism is wrong and ultimatley incoherent. Clearly you and a significant number of your readers see that.

I do honestly think if the intellectual “worldview” that dominates the world switched from physicalist dogmatics to at least an understanding of the Divine Reality underlying and permeating all, it would have a more powerful effect on civilization than any protest or political actions could have.

As far as matter being “maya,” that’s the Advaita view, not the Tantrics nor that of Sri Aurobindo. But that’s another comment!! We can, I think (I hope!) view that differently while still agreeing on the fundamental error of a physicalist belief system.

Prudence Louise's avatar

Yes I agree, and I didn’t mean to suggest a change of world view wouldn’t be a positive. I think that change is in progress, physicalists are at least forced to defend their views quite vigorously when it's always been almost a default view.

Which means it’s an excellent time to move beyond pointing out how wrong they are and make a positive contribution by explaining how Vedanta metaphysics treat the consciousness debate. I’m not Advaitan, it seems to me like having the goal of spiritual suicide. I’ve started work on an article outlining the solution of the school I follow, Chaitanya’s Achintya Bhedabheda. That does still involve maya as illusion or material shakti, but it’s a realist view.

Don Salmon's avatar

Thanks for the clarification - and actually, glad to hear you're not a pure Advaitan ("spiritual suicide"! I love that:). “Moving beyond pointing out how wrong they are” - i like that very much.

You might enjoy Swami Medhananda - who studied with Swami Sarvapriyananda (a pure Advaitan) when Medhananda first joined the Ramakrishna order.

He integrates Achintya Behdabehda, Advaita, the Qualified nondualism of Ramanuja,, all along the lines of Sri Aurobindo! Very interesting guy:>)). Here's a brief example of his perspective: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITVx_0cfNlQ

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Prudence Louise's avatar

Thanks for your comment and feedback. Two points....

It’s understandable that it feels like philosophy is declaring things “by definition” because it’s a logical error that’s being pointed out. Specifically a category error. It feels definitional, but its really conceptual.

I agree that consciousness is so useful evolutionarily we’d expect it to be selected for. What needs to be established is the property “what it feels like from the inside” is a biological phenomenon that can be acted upon by natural selection. The dispute is whether it’s a biological (physical) phenomenon in the first place.

Generally you hear the physicalist position phrased as consciousness “emerges” from the brain. The word emerge is doing all the philosophical work in that sentence and is just assuming as true what needs to be demonstrated. It's understandable that it happens, our confidence in scientific method is reasonable, but not absolute.

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Prudence Louise's avatar

I didn’t say there was a demise of neuroscience. If you want the heart of my argument it’s that consciousness isn’t a biological phenomena. Obviously if that’s true, we wouldn’t expect biology to explain it. I’m pointing out a category error.

What many people fail to notice is (and you’ve also done this in your comment), they assume (without argument) that consciousness is a biological process. That’s a metaphysical claim itself. But it’s a claim that’s been assumed by default without bothering to provide the string of if’s and assertions it must necessarily rely on to have rational justification.

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Prudence Louise's avatar

It’s an if. Same as mine. The question is, whose arguments are strongest. I just wrote a long essay giving reasons why it’s not biological and you reply with, you see no evidence.

You make a comparison with unicorns and ghosts but the analogy is faulty. The difference is, no one denies their own consciousness exists. The dispute isn't over its existence, but its metaphysical status, whether it’s physical or not.

Similarly for your argument about causal interaction, no one denies there is causation between body and mind, the problem for the physicalist is the reverse is also true, mind affects body. Pain causes moaning and complaining. Or as you say, we can casually affect our body “at will”. That two way causation is why it’s called the mind-body problem. That’s the problem, not the solution.